Is Pakistan an American client state?

In a Nutshell: Pakistan-US relations have been dominated by US goals. Whilst these goals have fluctuated over time, Pakistan's dependence on US military assistance has been a consistent historic feature in this relationship. Background Pakistan's dependence on US assistance traces back to Pakistani's independence in 1947 following World War II. Following its independence, two key events saw Pakistan seeking US patronage: India's occupation of Kashmir, and its forceful absorption of the princely states, and Distribution of military resources at independence from India were not only unequal but insufficient for its security. Pakistan realised the military disparity with India, along with its existential mindset, required outside assistance to counterbalance the perceived threat. The US was sought and became Pakistan's most important ally and partner from partition to present. Thus, historically Pakistan was set on a trajectory to conform to the wishes of a dominant state. Patron-Client The US needed Pakistan in a regional anti-communist alliance to curtail the USSR, whilst Pakistan needed US political and military support to counter India. In 1954, Pakistan and the US signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, and in 1955, Pakistan joined two of the US' three defence alliances, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). Moreover, between 1955 and 1965, the US Washington supplied Pakistan with over $700 million in military grants exposing Pakistani military officials to American training. This led to a change in the Pakistani military structure, which had previously been based on British training. During this time, Pakistan became the US' most allied ally. From the outset, the US-Pakistan relationship had the trappings of a patron-client relationship, constructed around Pakistan's dependence on US military assistance.  Consequently, while the US gained strategic ground against Russia during the Cold War and Al-Qaeda during the War on Terror, Pakistan received large inflows of US military assistance to counter the perceived Indian threat. Nature of the Relationship Various theorists have expounded and explored the key features of clientelistic behaviour. Some argue a patron-client relationship must involve a decided asymmetry in their military capabilities (Kinsella, 1998; Morrow, 1991), and Whilst associations take place at a variety of levels, it should be apparent both patron and client are closely tied together. Whilst Pakistan-US relations have largely been dominated by US goals in South Asia, these goals have fluctuated over time but Pakistan's dependence on US military assistance has remained a consistent feature. In such an arms transfer-dependent relationship, the client state derives direct benefits in its need for weaponry, however what benefits does the patron state accrue? The patron state expects influence and leverage over the client state, and compliance from the client government in line with its strategic and ideological goals. The purposes of US arms transfer policies were not to create a more stable South Asian region, rather to cultivate and then police a dependent and subservient client. When the Indo-China war broke out in 1962, India's complete defeat at the hands of China left India completely defenceless on the Kashmir front and presented Pakistan a novel opportunity to liberate Kashmir. At the same time, the United States had agreed to an unconditional military support to India, in an effort to counter Chinese influence. Given US strategic engagement with India at this juncture, it was important that Pakistan, motivated by its own strategic interests, not jeopardize US assistance to India. Hence, on October 28th 1962, Kennedy wrote to Ayub Khan, suggesting that he should assure Nehru that: "He could count on Pakistan's taking no action on the frontiers to alarm India". Even though the idea of the strengthening of Pakistan's most determined foes by Pakistan's closest ally was seen as a betrayal, Pakistan acquiesced to US demands and demonstrated the extent of US influence on its policymaking. Conclusion Pakistan-US relations have been dominated by US goals. Whilst these goals have fluctuated over time, Pakistan's dependence on US military assistance has been a consistent historic feature in this relationship. References Abbas, H. (2014). Boon or bane? Historical analysis of Pakistan's foreign aid inflow. The Express Tribune. http://tribune.com.pk/story/710019/boon-or-bane-historical-analysis-of-pakistans-foreign-aid-inflow/  Ahmed Waqas Waheed, (2017) Pakistan's Dependence and US Patronage: The Politics of 'Limited Influence Moon, B.E. (1983). The foreign policy of the dependent state. International Studies Quarterly, 27(3), 315–340. http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2600686?sid=21106094792663&uid=2&uid=4  Schaffer, T.C. (2002). US influence on Pakistan: Can partners have divergent priorities? The Washington Quarterly, 26(1), 169–183.   

Pakistan-US relations have been lukewarm ever since Pakistan's independence in 1947. The USSR officially recognized Pakistan as a country before the US did. In 1960s, when Pakistan was in the midst of martial law, being ruled by Dictator-President Ayub Khan, USSR agreed to set up a Steel Mill in Pakistan and even resolved the 1965 War crisis at the Tashkent Conference, bringing about peace in the region. The USA didn't show a very pleasing response. However, suddenly, in the late 1970s, US-Pak relations improved significantly. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan stimulated Pakistan's efforts for material gains, while the US started striving for supremacy over the Soviets. Both eventually came closer to common interests, and Pakistan became a US ally. When Benazir Bhutto replaced General Zia following his tragic plane crash, the US suddenly adopted a stiffer and rigid attitude towards Pakistan, withholding the F-16 fighter jets, the cost of whom were already paid by Pakistan. But as diplomatic relations developed and democracy replaced dictatorship, the jets were later delivered. Very recently, PM Imran Khan and the COAS Bajwa visited the U.S. and held meetings with President Trump and U.S. Gen. The only thing now that can be hoped, is that diplomatic relations once again thrive between the two countries as they find some area of common interest. In short, Pakistan has been a freelancer to the US, occasionally providing strategic profits, in return for economic and financial gains.